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Arizona v. Fulminante: Where's the
Harm in Harmless Error?
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v.
Fulminante' spurred immediate controversy. It seemed to announce
a significant change in constitutional law, declaring that the ad-
mission of a coerced confession could be considered harmless er-
ror.2 Many members of the media and the legal community viewed
the decision as a major blow to the protection of defendants'
rights. 3 Others questioned the impact the case would have on the
delicate balance between law enforcement interests and the rights
of the accused. 4
This Note examines the factual and legal background of the
Fulminante decision and its implications. Part I sets forth the facts,
procedures, and holdings of the lower court opinions, concluding
with the issues and holdings at the Supreme Court level. 5 Part II
discusses the two major legal doctrines involved: the voluntariness
of confessions and harmless constitutional error.6 Part III describes
the Court's application of these legal doctrines to the facts of
Fulminante.7 Part IV concludes that the true significance of Ful-
minante may not be what was decided, but how it was decided.8
I III S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
2 Id. at 1251.
1 See, e.g., On Coerced Confessions... Rehnquist's Ideological Mischief, New York
Times Editorial in 104 Los ANOELaS DAImY J., Apr. 9, 1991, at 6; Ira Mickenberg, NAT'L
L.J., Aug. 19, 1991 ("Fulminante demonstrates that the present Supreme Court is willing
to jettison even the oldest and most established constitutional protections afforded criminal
defendants."); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Devaluing Liberty, MANHATTAN LAw., July-Aug. 1991,
Commentary section, at 15 ("The Rehnquist Court unravels the safety net protecting
individuals from police and prosecutorial abuse.").
4 See Daniel J. Capra, Involuntary Confession and Harmless Error, N.Y. L. J., May
10, 1991, Evidence section, at 3 ("Fulminante if anything provides greater protection against
police extraction of involuntary confessions than heretofore existed."); Bruce Fein, Fifth
Amendment False Alarm, M.NaHrrA LAW., June, 1991, Commentary section, at 12.
1 See infra notes 9-21 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 22-93 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 94-118 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 119-34 and accompanying text.
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I. THE PATH TO THE SUPREME COURT
The path to the Court began with a murder. Oreste Fulminante's
11-year-old stepdaughter was killed in September of 1982. Because
of inconsistent statements to the police, he was soon a suspect. No
charges were filed, however, and Fulminante traveled from Arizona
to New Jersey. After two arrests and convictions on federal charges
of possession of a firearm by a felon, he was imprisoned in Ray
Brook Federal Correctional Institution in New York. He became
acquainted with an inmate named Anthony Sarivola, a former
police officer convicted of extortion and linked to organized crime.
While at Ray Brook, Sarivola masqueraded as an organized crime
figure but was actually a paid informant for the Federal Bureau
of Investigation. Sarivola had heard rumors that Fulminante was
suspected in his stepdaughter's death and passed these to the FBI.
The FBI requested that he find out more.9
While other inmates at Ray Brook treated Fulminante harshly,
due in part to the rumors of his involvement in the Arizona child
murder, Sarivola formed a friendship with Fulminante. Sarivola
offered Fulminante protection from the other inmates, but only if
Fulminante agreed to tell him the truth about the murder. Fulmi-
nante initially denied his guilt but eventually confessed to Sarivola
with a detailed account of the crime. After Fulminante's release in
May of 1984, Sarivola and his fianc6e drove him to Pennsylvania.
On that trip, Fulminante confessed once again, this time to Sari-
vola's future wife. He was indicted for first degree murder on
September 4, 1984.10
Fulminante unsuccessfully moved to suppress the two confes-
sions at trial. He claimed that the statement to Sarivola was coerced
and the second confession was the "fruit" of the first. The trial
court found the confessions voluntary, basing its findings on the
stipulated facts." Both confessions were used at trial, and in De-
cember of 1985, a jury found Fulminante guilty of first degree
murder. By special verdict, the trial court sentenced him to death.' 2
The Supreme Court of Arizona considered a number of issues
on appeal,'" but initially reversed the trial court only on its finding
9 State v. Fulminante, 778 P.2d 602, 605-06 (Ariz. 1988).
,0 Id. at 609.
" See Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1251 (1991).
12 Id.
,1 Fulninante evidently took a "shotgun" approach on appeal, challenging virtually
every significant ruling by the trial court in hopes of obtaining a reversal based on any
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that Fulminante's confession to Sarivola was voluntary.' 4 This rul-
ing was based on both the stipulated facts from the motion to
suppress and the evidence at trial.' 5 However, the court concluded
that, in view of the overwhelming evidence, the admission of the
first confession was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt 16
and affirmed the conviction and death sentence. On motion for
reconsideration, Fulrninante raised many of the same issues from
his appeal. He also argued that under federal constitutional law a
coerced confession could not be held harmless error. The Arizona
court agreed, with one dissent.'7 It set aside Fulminante's convic-
tion and remanded the case for a new trial without the use of the
coerced confession.' 8
On certiorari from Arizona, the United States Supreme Court
considered: (1) whether Fulminante's confession to Sarivola was
coerced; (2) whether the admission at trial of a coerced confession
is subject to harmless-error analysis; and (3) if so, whether using
single error. The court resolved the issues on appeal as follows: (1) Fulminante was not
subject to a custodial interrogation by Sarivola, so no Miranda warnings were required; (2)
Fulminante was not entitled to counsel because he was not under indictment at the time of
Sarivola's questioning; (3) the fruit of the poisonous tree was not applicable because the
passing of six months, Fulminante's release from prison, and the circumstances of the
second confession meant the second confession was not tainted by the first; (4) it was not
error to admit a photograph of the victim, where it was relevant to disputed testimony and
not inflammatory as altered; (5) relationship with victim, association with Sarivola, prior
felony convictions, and relationship with wife were all found properly admitted character
evidence against Fulminante; (6) evidence that a third party committed the murder was
found too vague to admit; (7) evidence of FBI agent's opinion of Anthony Sarivola's
character was properly admitted where Fulminante attacked Sarivola's character; (8) detec-
tive's opinion of Fulminante's guilt could be admitted where defense counsel "opened the
door" to such evidence; (9) alleged errors concerning death penalty issues and ineffective
assistance of counsel did not affect result of proceeding. State v. Fulminante, 778 P.2d 602
passim (1988).
' Id. at 609.
I Id. at 608-09. The Arizona Supreme Court found that Sarivola's offer of protection
rendered the confession involuntary. Id. at 609 n.1. The court also held that the prosecution
had not met its burden in the suppression hearing of showing the confession was voluntary,
as required under Arizona law. Id. at 609.
11 Id. at 611.
" Id. at 629 (Cameron, J., dissenting). In the court's supplementary opinion, id. at
626, it noted that the four federal cases and one Arizona case relied on in its harmless-
error analysis each involved violation of a defendant's Miranda rights, not coerced confes-
sions. Such Miranda violations have been held subject to harmless-error analysis. See, e.g.,
United States v. Mahar, 801 F.2d 1477 (6th Cir. 1986). Cameron argued that harmless-error
analysis was appropriate where a confession is coerced only in a technical sense, and is
cumulative of other testimony or evidence, but conceded that United States Supreme Court
decisions have held otherwise. Fulminante, 778 P.2d at 628.
IS Fulminante, 778 P.2d at 627.
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Fulminante's confession at trial constituted harmless error. In an
unusually structured split decision, the Court found that the con-
fession was coerced,19 decided that the admission of a coerced
confession could be harmless error,20 but concluded, based on the
available facts, that the admission of Fulminante's confession was
not harmless error.2'
II. WmEN DoCTRINEs COLLIDE: COERCED CONFESSIONS AND
HARmLESS ERROR
A. The Voluntariness of Confessions
Determining whether a particular confession was voluntary and
admissible or coerced and inadmissible has been a difficult question
for the Court. Due in part to the fact-specific nature of the inquiry
and the inherent subjectiveness of assessing a person's will and
reactions, the Court has arrived at no mechanically-applicable stan-
dard. Decisions reflect a tension between concern over police meth-
ods used to obtain confessions and law enforcement's need for
confessions as evidence. Examining the Supreme Court cases that
most explicitly discuss the voluntariness standard, the decision that
established the constitutional basis for federal oversight of state
cases on the issue, and some of the factors that have been found
significant in the application of the standard, sheds light on the
voluntariness question raised in Fulminante.
Brain v. United States2 contains the seeds of the modern
voluntariness standard. In Brain, the Court observed that "all the
decided cases necessarily rest upon the state of facts which existed
in the particular case . . . ."3 The Court further noted:
The rule is not that ... the proof must be adequate to establish
that the particular communications contained in a statement were
voluntarily made, but it must be sufficient to establish that the
making of the statement was voluntary; that is to say that, from
the causes, which the law treats as legally sufficient to engender
in the mind of the accused hope or fear in respect to the crime
charged, the accused was not involuntarily impelled to make a
11 111 S. Ct. at 1252.
Id. at 1251, 1264-65.
21 Id. at 1258.
- 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
23 Id. at 548.
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statement, when but for the improper influences he would have
remained silent. 24
The test is a subtle one, involving the facts of the particular case,
the subjective state of mind of the accused, and the legal inference
to be drawn. The distinction between the substantive content of a
particular statement and the circumstances under which the state-
ment was made was an important one in Bram.2 But the distinction
also suggests the complexity of inquiring into the psychological
effects on the accused.
Bram, a federal case, grounded its discussion on the Fifth
Amendment: 26 "[W]herever a question arises whether a confession
is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by
that portion of the fifth amendment to the constitution of the
United States, commanding that no person 'shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself."' 27 The Court
examined the reasons for the adoption of the Fifth Amendment
and tied these to the inadmissibility of involuntary confessions.
The Fifth Amendment was in part a rejection of the inquisitorial
methods of interrogation used in Europe, where questioning often
amounted to browbeating or entrapment. 2 Elsewhere, the Court
suggested reliability as a rationale.29 For the Bram Court, admitting
an involuntary confession meant reversal,
since the prosecution cannot on the one hand, offer evidence to
prove guilt, ... and on the other hand, for the purpose of
24 Id. at 549.
25 In Bram, the accused was stripped before being questioned by a police officer. The
officer told Brain he was convinced of his guilt, but implied that he would get easier
treatment if he named an accomplice. Brain never actually confessed, but did give a
statement that allowed an inference of guilt. It was used at trial as a confession. The Court
held that
the impression is irresistibly produced that [the incriminating statement] must
necessarily have been the result of either hope or fear, or both, operating on
the mind.... [T]he fear [was] that, if he remained silent, it would be
considered an admission of guilt .... and... by denying, there was hope of
removing the suspicion from himself.
Id. at 562.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
- Bram, 168 U.S. at 542.
25 Id. at 544 (citing Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596 (1896) (noting that English
criminal procedure eventually banned self-incrimination as a rule of evidence, while this
right became constitutionally protected in the United States)).
Id. at 546 (quoting GIBERT, EVIDENCE 139 (2d ed. 1760) ("[Plain and force may
compel men to confess what is not the truth of facts, and consequently such extorted
confessions are not to be depended on.")).
1992-93]
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avoiding the consequences of the error, caused by its wrongful
admission, be heard to assert that the matter offered as a con-
fession was not prejudicial, because it did not tend to prove
guilt.30
Brown v. MississippPl was the first decision to hold that the
use of involuntary confessions in state proceedings violates the
Fourteenth Amendment.3 2 In Brown, the coerciveness of the police
tactics was not in doubt. Three black men arrested for murder
were repeatedly and severely whipped until they confessed to the
crime, using the details demanded by their questioners.33 Within a
week of the murder, the men were convicted and sentenced to
death. Without the confessions, there was no evidence on which
they could have been convicted. The Mississippi Supreme Court
upheld the convictions on procedural grounds, finding no violation
of any constitutional right. The United States Supreme Court took
offense not only at the police tactics but also at the complicity of
the Mississippi courts:
The trial court was fully advised by the undisputed evidence of
the way in which the confessions had been procured. The trial
court knew that there was no other evidence upon which the
conviction and sentence could be based. Yet it proceeded to
permit conviction and to pronounce sentence. The conviction and
sentence were void for want of the essential elements of due
process, and the proceeding thus vitiated could be challenged in
any appropriate manner. It was challenged before the Supreme
Court of the State by the express invocation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. That court entertained the challenge, considered the
federal question thus presented, but declined to enforce petition-
ers' constitutional right. The court thus denied a federal right
See Bram, 168 U.S. at 541.
31 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
297 U.S. at 281-83 (citing Brown v. State, 161 So. 465, 470-71 (1935)).
[One defendant was hanged before being beaten, id. at 281, and the two
others] were made to strip and they were laid over chairs and their backs were
cut to pieces with a leather strap with buckles on it, and they were likewise
made by the said deputy to understand that the whipping would be continued
unless and until they confessed .... Further details of the brutal treatment
to which these helpless prisoners were subjected need not be pursued. It is
sufficient to say that in pertinent respects the transcript reads more like pages
torn from some medieval account than a record made within the confines of
a modem civilization which aspires to an enlightened constitutional govern-
ment.
Id. at 282.
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fully established and specially set up and claimed and the judg-
ment must be reversed A
4
While Brown announced the constitutional basis for rejecting
involuntary confessions coming from state courts, it did not address
the standard for evaluating voluntariness. As noted in Bram, cases
deciding this question are very fact-specific.3 5 In many cases fol-
lowing Brown, the issue was decided without invoking any partic-
ular standard. 36 In those and later decisions, the Court identified
various factors bearing on the voluntariness of confessions. These
include the subjection of the defendant to violence or threats of
violence; 37 the length of the defendant's detention, the duration
and intensity of his interrogation, and deprivation of food or
sleep; 38 and the defendant's age, education, and mental capacity.39
The Court did not, however, remain silent on the voluntariness
standard, and two decisions in 1961 mark the most recent and
most thorough examinations of the question.
The first of these two decisions was Rogers v. Richmond.4°
Rogers was convicted of murder, and the evidence against him
included a confession. In a proceeding without the jury, the trial
judge deemed the confession voluntary. The Supreme Court of
Errors of Connecticut affirmed. 4 Rogers sought a writ of habeas
corpus on the voluntariness question. After a complex route through
the federal courts, the writ was denied and the Connecticut decision
Id. at 287 (citations omitted).
31 Brain, 168 U.S. at 548-49.
The rule is not that in order to render a statement admissible the proof must
be adequate to establish that the particular communications contained in a
statement were voluntarily made, but it must be to say, that from the causes,
which the law treats as legally sufficient to engender in the mind of the accused
hope or fear in respect to the crime charged, the accused was not involuntarily
impelled to make a statement, when but for the improper influences, he would
have remained silent.
Id.
36 See, e.g., Lisbena v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941) (prolonged questioning before
arraignment and without counsel held not to have rendered confession 10 days later coerced);
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (confessions by poorly educated defendants held
coerced, where they were subjected to isolation and protracted questioning until they
"broke"); Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924) (confession made while ill
and in extended police custody held not voluntary).
See, e.g., Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967).
3S See, e.g., Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 505 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
19 See, e.g., Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404, 407 (1967).
- 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
4' State v. Rogers, 120 A.2d 409 (Conn. 1956).
1992-93]
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allowed to stand. 42 When the case reached the United States Su-
preme Court, however, Justice Frankfurter, writing for the major-
ity, found that the trial judge and the Supreme Court of Errors
had applied the wrong standard. The courts had judged admissi-
bility of the confession by its "probable truth or falsity. And this
is not a permissible standard under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." ' 43 Instead, they should have asked
"whether the behavior of the State's law enforcement officials was
such as to overbear petitioner's will to resist and bring about
confessions not freely self-determined . . . ." 4
Frankfurter elaborated on the voluntariness standard in a de-
cision later the same year, Culombe v. Connecticut.45 The lengthy
opinion discussed two conflicting interests: law enforcement's need
to question suspects about crimes to which there are no witnesses,
and the idea that it is fundamentally wrong to compel a man to
confess and then use the confession to convict him.46 In an ap-
proach reminiscent of Brain, Frankfurter referred to the inquisi-
torial methods once known to America's founders, and to both
the English and American approaches to the problem. 47 Various
factors such as extensive questioning, delay in arraignment, failure
to warn a prisoner of his rights, and denial of communication with
friends or legal counsel, combined with "all the surrounding cir-
cumstances," should be considered. 4 After citing some of the
above-quoted language from Rogers v. Richmond, Frankfurter
described a three-phased inquiry:
First, there is the business of finding the crude historical facts,
the external, "phenomenological" occurrences and events sur-
rounding the confession, Second, because the concept of "vol-
untariness" is one which concerns a mental state, there is the
imaginative recreation, largely inferential, of internal, "psycho-
42 365 U.S. 537-40. In the habeas corpus proceedings, the U.S. District Court held an
additional hearing, found the confession involuntary and vacated the conviction. This
decision was in turn vacated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which
remanded the case back to the district court with instructions to examine the entire state
court record. On remand, the district court adhered to the state court's determination,
dismissing the habeas corpus petition and letting stand the finding that the confession was
voluntary. The court of appeals affirmed on appeal. Id.
41 Id. at 543-44.
"Id. at 544.
Is 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
6Id. at 578-81.
4, Id. at 581-87.
4I Id. at 601-02.
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logical" fact. Third, there is the application to this psychological
fact of standards for judgment informed by the larger legal
conceptions ordinarily characterized as rules of law but which,
also, comprehend both induction from, and anticipation of, fac-
tual circumstances. 49
Culombe thus gives a very thorough examination of the concerns
surrounding involuntary confessions and an articulate expression
of the voluntariness test. The decision does not, however, simplify
the inquiry or even change it dramatically from the Brain era
inquiry.50
Faced with an allegedly coerced confession, admitted in a state
court and challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment, a court
must independently5 assess the factual, psychological, and legal
implications under the Culombe "totality of the circumstances"
test. This test reflects the Court's attempts to balance law enforce-
ment needs and defendants' rights, and its application provides
plentiful examples of significant factors. This was the state of the
law on the voluntariness of confessions when Fulminante reached
the Court . 2
4Id. at 603.
"' Five years after Culombe, the Court dramatically changed confession law in the
landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Finding custodial interrogations
by police inherently coercive, Miranda required police to inform a suspect of the right to
remain silent and the right to counsel. Confessions obtained without this warning are
deemed involuntary and inadmissible. However, in situations not involving both police
custody and interrogation, the Culombe due process voluntariness test still applies, and it
can be invoked as a "back up" even if Miranda warnings are given. See Keith R. Dolliver,
Voluntariness of Confessions in Habeas Corpus Proceedings: The Proper Standard for
Appellate Review, 57 U. Cm. L. Ray. 141, 144 n.10 (1990).
s In Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985), the Court held that this question is one
for independent federal determination. The precise question in Miller was whether, in a
habeas corpus proceeding, the state court's determination of voluntariness was presumed to
be correct as a factual issue. Id. at 109. The issue arose because of confusion over the
effect of a change in statutory habeas corpus law, but the holding reaffirmed the independ-
ent-review approach for cases coming to the Court on direct appeal. According to the
Court, independent federal determination is required not because voluntariness is a question
of law or a mixed question of law and fact, but because securing convictions using coerced
confessions violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "[Tactics for
eliciting inculpatory statements must fall within the broad constitutional boundaries imposed
by the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of fundamental fairness." Id. at 110.
12 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), is mentioned in both the majority
and dissenting opinions on the issue of voluntariness in Fulminante. See Fulminante v.
Arizona, III S. Ct. 1246, 1248, 1256 (1991). The Court in Schneckloth applied the volun-
tariness test for confessions to the issue of consent to a search, and relied on Culombe for
the test. After identifying some of the factors considered in confession cases, the Court
concluded: "In all of these cases, the Court determined the factual circumstances surround-
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
B. Harmless Constitutional Error
While the voluntariness test has a long history, the harmless
constitutional error doctrine is a relatively recent one. Its birth in
Chapman v. California53 in 1967 marked a significant change in
the law, answering some questions but also raising new ones. The
background of the Chapman decision, the actual holding, and its
treatment of coerced confessions are essential to understanding
Fulminante.
1. Background of the Chapman Decision
Generally, harmless-error rules allow affirmations of convic-
tions where the defendant was not prejudiced by an error found
to have been committed at trial.5 4 This view prevailed at early
English common law but was supplanted by the "Exchequer rule,"
which required automatic reversal. 55 In the United States, the au-
tomatic reversal rule was criticized on two grounds: as a burden
on the judicial system, where the end result would be the same if
the error were indeed harmless, and as encouragement for lawyers
to introduce errors against their clients to obtain reversal on ap-
peal.5 6 By the time of Chapman, all fifty states and the federal
system had harmless-error statutes or rules in place.5 7 Before Chap-
man, however, the Court had not "squarely faced the issue of
whether federal constitutional rights violations could be harmless.
Two early cases pointed in opposite directions. In Bram v.
United States,58 the Court required automatic reversal of a convic-
tion based on a violation of the Fifth Amendment, while in Motes
v. United States59 it found harmless a violation of a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right. Motes, however, was the only case before
Chapman in which the Supreme Court held a constitutional error
ing the confession, assessed the psychological impact on the accused; and evaluated the
legal significance of how the accused reacted." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226 (citing Col-
umbe, 367 U.S. at 603).
53 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
" See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 718 (6th ed. 1990).
5 See Note, Harmless Constitutional Error, 20 STAN. L. REv. 83 (1967); see also
Philip J. Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chapman v. California,
53 MINN. L. REv. 519 (1969).
16 See Note, supra note 55, at 83-84.
1, See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22.
" 168 U.S. 532 (1897). See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
178 U.S. 458 (1900).
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harmless. 6° After Chapman, the Court reversed convictions in a
number of cases involving constitutional violations without dis-
cussing harmless error. 6' Based on these cases, many commentators
concluded that no constitutional error could be harmless. 62
One type of constitutional error promised to force the Court
to address this question directly. In 1961, Mapp v. Ohio6 applied
the federal exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States64 to the
states, making unconstitutionally seized evidence inadmissible in
both state and federal courts. 65 Lower federal and state appellate
courts, however, were confused about whether violations of these
rules could ever constitute harmless error. 6 This confusion led the
Court to grant certiorari in the case of State v. Fahy67 in 1963.
Fahy involved a state conviction based in part on evidence
admitted in violation of Mapp. The Connecticut Supreme Court
of Errors affirmed, finding the error harmless under that state's
harmless-error statute.61 The United States Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the error was clearly harmful. Thus, the Court did
not reach the question of whether Mapp violations found to be
harmless required automatic reversal. 69 It was not clear from the
opinion what standard of harmlessness was applied, and legal
commentators and various state courts reached varying conclusions
as to Fahy's mandate to the states.70 Thus, whether violations of
60 See Mause, supra note 55, at 521; Note, supra note 55, at 85.
61 See, e.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (denial of speedy trial);
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (admission of coerced confession); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (denial of right to counsel); Bollenbach v. United States,
326 U.S. 607 (1946) (jury instruction included unconstitutional presumption); Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (conviction based on unconstitutional statute).
62 See, e.g., Robert W. Gibbs, Prejudicial Error: Admissions and Exclusions of
Evidence in the Federal Courts, 3 Vn.. L. REv. 48, 67 (1957); David R. Manwaring,
California and the Fourth Amendment, 16 STAN. L. REv. 318, 325-26 (1964); Note, The
Harmless Error Rule Reviewed, 47 CoLum. L. REv. 450, 461 (1947).
63 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
" 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
65 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660. The Weeks rule was developed as a protection of defen-
dants' Fourth Amendment rights by deterring violations. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391. Mapp
applied this rule to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 367 U.S. at 650.
" For Weeks violations, four circuits applied the federal harmless-error statute (Ch.
139, § 110, 63 Stat. 105 (1949) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1964))), one required
automatic reversal, and one vacillated. In Mapp violations, at least 13 state appellate courts
applied their harmless-error rules. See Note, supra note 55, at 86 nn.26-30.
67 183 A.2d 256 (Conn. 1962), rev'd, 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
', 183 A.2d at 262.
', 375 U.S. at 85-86.
70 See Mause, supra note 55, at 522-23.
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the Mapp and Weeks exclusionary rules could be harmless, and
the more general question of whether any constitutional error could
be harmless, remained to be answered in Chapman.
2. The Chapman Holding
In Chapman, two defendants were convicted of murder in a
California state court.7' As the California Constitution permitted,72
the prosecutor commented extensively on the defendants' failure
to testify. 73 The defendants appealed to the California Supreme
Court. Before that court reached a decision, the United States
Supreme Court decided Griffin v. California, holding California's
constitutional provision invalid under the Constitution of the United
States. 74 Permitting prosecutors to comment on defendants' silence
was said to penalize defendants for exercising their Fifth Amend-
ment right not to be compelled to incriminate themselves. When it
heard the Chapman defendants' appeal, the California Supreme
Court applied its harmless-error rule to this constitutional error
and affirmed the conviction. The questions before the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Chapman, therefore, were "whether there can ever
be harmless constitutional error and whether the error here was
harmless .... ,,7
The Court first asserted that the question was a federal one. 76
Justice Black's opinion for the Court quoted James Madison's
view that "the 'independent' federal courts would be the 'guardian
of those rights' found in the Bill of Rights, including the Fifth
Amendment as implicated in Chapman.7 7 Black specifically rejected
the idea that all federal constitutional errors require automatic
reversal and fashioned a harmless constitutional error standard by
7 People v. Teale, 404 P.2d 209 (Cal. 1965), rev'd sub nom., Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18 (1967).
72 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
71 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 19.
- 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
11 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 20.
76 Id. at 21.
" Id.
But the error from which these petitioners suffered was a denial of rights
guaranteed against invasion by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, rights
rooted in the Bill of Rights, offered and championed in the Congress by James
Madison, who told the Congress that the "independent" federal courts would
be the "guardians of those rights."
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reference to existing state and federal harmless-error rules. 78 He
considered errors that affect defendants' "substantial rights" harm-
ful and defined harmless constitutional error as error that does
"not contribute to the verdict obtained. ' 79 Finally, the Court held
that the beneficiary of the error had the burden of proving the
error harmless.8 0 In brief, Chapman held that some constitutional
errors may be harmless and not require automatic reversal, but
that "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless,
the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt." 8'
3. Chapman and Coerced Confessions
While Chapman clearly stated that some constitutional errors
can be harmless and set a harmless constitutional error standard,
it did not clearly set out whether all violations of federal consti-
tutional rights were to be subject to this standard. At one point in
the opinion, Black observed that "prior cases have indicated that
there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that
their infraction can never be treated as harmless error . . . ." and
referred by footnote8 2 to Payne v. Arkansas,8 3 Gideon v. Wain-
wright,84 and Tumey v. Ohio.85 In finding the Griffin violation
harmful, he wrote that the error "can no more be considered
harmless than the introduction against a defendant of a coerced
confession," citing Payne as an example.86
Different conclusions can be drawn from the language used in
Chapman. Writing shortly after Chapman was decided, one com-
mentator interpreted the earlier quote as incorporating a line of
cases requiring reversal without evaluating the harm of the error. 7
73 Id. at 21-24 (citing Ch. 139, § 110, 63 Stat. 105 (1949) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2111 (1964)), which provides: "On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any
case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to
errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties."; Fed. R. Crim.
P. 52(a), which provides: "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect
substantial rights shall be disregarded.").
79 Id. at 24.
90 Id.
" Id.
Id. at 23 & n.8.
Id. (citing 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (coerced confession)).
Id. (citing 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel)).
Id. (citing 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (impartial judge)).
Id. at 26 (citing Payne, 356 U.S. at 568).
See Note, supra note 55, at 88-89.
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Another concluded that the intent of Black's footnote was to
include "any error which falls into the categories established by
these [three] cases" as requiring automatic reversal, 8 and saw the
later reference to Payne as conclusive that the admission of a
coerced confession leads to automatic reversal.8 9 A later observer
described the footnote reference as "simply descriptive of Supreme
Court precedents" and possibly a "relic of the pre-Chapman view
that all federal constitutional errors require automatic reversal.'' 9
Beyond the literal meaning of the opinion, the rationale behind
submitting some constitutional errors and not others to harmless-
error analysis is unclear. One writer distinguished between those
errors affecting the reliability of the guilt-determination process,
those having little impact on this process, and those falling some-
where in between. Coerced confessions would be placed in the first
category. 91 Another author identified five rationales for requiring
automatic reversal: (1) where the constitutional error was inherently
prejudicial; (2) where the constitutional error provided inherently
unreliable evidence; (3) where the error was an example of police
misconduct; (4) where the error was an example of prosecutorial
misconduct; or (5) where the error was an example of conduct that
undermines public confidence in the criminal justice system. Under
this view, coerced confessions are clearly inherently prejudicial but
could fit in all five categories. 92 Both approaches assumed that the
admission of a coerced confession requires automatic reversal.
4. Chapman Applied
Supreme Court decisions after Chapman expressed various ra-
tionales for applying the harmless constitutional error standard.
Commentators have described three distinct approaches taken by
the Court in identifying harmless error: focusing on the error to
judge whether it contributed to the verdict; asking whether, in the
absence of the error, there was overwhelming evidence to support
" See Mause, supra note 55, at 538 n.129.
"Id. at 544.
10 Martha A. Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error-A
Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 15, 32 (1976).
9, See Note, supra note 55, at 89-97 (describing coerced confessions as inherently
unreliable).
11 See Mause, supra note 55, at 540-46 (arguing that the goal of the harmless-error
doctrine-judicial economy-is best served by requiring automatic reversal in cases of
coerced confessions; such confessions are inherently prejudicial and will almost always be
found harmful, making litigation on the issue of harmlessness inefficient).
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the verdict; and asking whether the error resulted in merely cu-
mulative evidence. 93 Although Supreme Court opinions do not
explicitly distinguish between these approaches, recognizing them
can be useful in analyzing harmless-error decisions.
Chapman changed basic assumptions about how to treat con-
stitutional errors, finding that some could be harmless but requiring
the beneficiary of an error to prove the error's harmlessness beyond
a reasonable doubt. The decision spawned new questions as well.
The intent of Chapman's footnote reference to cases requiring
automatic reversal is unclear. The Court has not yet expressed a
rationale for requiring automatic reversal for some constitutional
errors but not others, leaving considerable room for speculation.
Finally, the Court's approach to harmless-error analysis has been
inconsistent in decisions since Chapman. It was against this back-
drop that Justices White and Rehnquist squared off in Fulminante.
III. THE FULmINANTE DEBATE: WHITE V. REHNQUIST
Arizona v. Fulminante94 reached the United States Supreme
Court on petition for certiorari. 95 Fulminante had been convicted
of murder and sentenced to death partly because of his confession
to fellow inmate and FBI informant, Sarivola. The Arizona Su-
preme Court held that this confession was involuntary, and its
admission required automatic reversal and a new trial without the
confession. Shifting majorities of the United States Supreme Court
addressed three questions in the following order: (1) whether Ful-
minante's confession to Sarivola was coerced; (2) if so, whether
the admission of a coerced confession can be harmless error; and
(3) whether the admission of Fulminante's confession constituted
harmless error. To frame the debate, the issues are presented in
that order, beginning with the majority opinion on each question.
A. Voluntariness of the Confession
As required by Miller v. Fenton,96 the Justices undertook an
independent assessment of the voluntariness of Fulminante's con-
9, See Field, supra note 90, at 16. See also Note, Harmless Constitutional Error: An
Analysis of Its Current Application, 33 BAYLOR L. REv. 961 (1981); Mause, supra note 55;
Comment, Harmless Error: The Need for a Uniform Standard, 53 ST. Jon's L. REv. 541
(1979); Comment, Principles for Application of the Harmless Error Standard, 41 U. Cm.
L. REv. 616 (1974); Note, Harmless Constitutional Error: A Reappraisal, 83 HARv. L. REv.
814 (1970).
- 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
- 494 U.S. 1055 (1990).
- 474 U.S. 104 (1985). See supra note 51.
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fession, applying a "totality of the circumstances" approach de-
rived from Culombe v. Connecticut.97 The Court split 5-4 on this
issue, with each side relying on opposite lower court opinions.
Justice White, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens,
and Scalia in the majority opinion, adopted much of the Arizona
Supreme Court's findings. He quoted that court's conclusions that
Fulminante was in danger of physical harm as an alleged child
murderer in prison, was receiving "rough treatment," and was
compelled to confess because of Sarivola's offer of protection.
White found that these factors combined to present a credible
threat that physical violence would occur unless Fulminante con-
fessed.98 The opinion emphasized the mental elements of coercion,
likening Fulminante's situation to that of the accused in Payne v.
Arkansas, in which, among other abuses, the interrogating police
officer promised protection from an angry mob if the accused
would confess.99 Noting that Sarivola, as an FBI informant, was a
government agent, the opinion concluded, "we agree ... that
Fulminante's will was overborne in such a way as to render his
confession the product of coercion."'' 1
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor, Ken-
nedy, and Souter in dissent, agreed with the trial court's conclusion
that the confession was voluntary. He quoted from facts stipulated
to the trial court on Fulminante's motion to suppress the confes-
sion: "At no time did the defendant indicate he was in fear of
other inmates nor did he ever seek Mr. Sarivola's 'protection."" ' 0'
While acknowledging that the Arizona Supreme Court based its
conclusion on additional evidence available only from the trial
record, the dissent found of no particular significance claims of
rough treatment and offers of protection. The opinion also stressed
-7 367 U.S. 568 (1961). For a discussion of the Culombe decision, see supra notes 45-
52 and accompanying text.
" Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1252-53 (White, J., delivering the opinion of the court).
" Id. at 1253 (citing 356 U.S. 560, 563-64 (1958)). Short of physical torture, Payne
involved many of the worst excesses of police interrogation methods. The accused, who
had only a fifth-grade education, was arrested without a warrant and never taken before a
magistrate, was held for two days without legal counsel, was denied access to friends and
family, and was deprived of food and shoes and socks. Just before the defendant confessed,
the interrogating officer told him there were thirty or forty people outside who wanted to
"get to him," and that if he told the truth the officer would prevent them from doing so.
Payne, 356 U.S. at 563-64.
107 111 S. Ct. at 1253.
10I d. at 1262 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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that Fulminante was no stranger to prison, did not know Sarivola
was an informant, and had had only brief and non-threatening
conversations with Sarivola. The dissent concluded that "the Court
today embraces a more expansive definition of [the term 'invol-
untary'] than is warranted by any of our decided cases."'0
B. Harmless Error and Coerced Confessions
On the issue of the applicability of harmless-error analysis to
the admission of coerced confessions, the Court again split 5-4.
Rehnquist, joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Souter, be-
gan by citing Chapman'03 and asserting that, since that decision,
"the Court... has recognized that most constitutional errors can
be harmless."' 1°4 He characterized such cases as involving 'trial
error,' . . . which occurred during the presentation of the case to
the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the
context of other evidence presented .... "05 Rehnquist contrasted
trial errors with "structural defects," which affect "[t]he entire
conduct of the trial from beginning to end . . ."06 Labeling the
admission of an involuntary confession "a classic 'trial error,"' he
distinguished coerced confessions (represented by Payne) from the
other two constitutional errors in the Chapman footnote. 0 7 First,
he argued that the Chapman language was merely a historical
reference to the holdings of those three cases that required auto-
matic reversal. Rehnquist asserted that the reasoning used by the
Payne Court in requiring automatic reversal should not apply after
Chapman. When Payne rejected the view that the conviction could
stand in spite of the coerced confession, Rehnquist argued, it
rejected not the Chapman harmless-error analysis, but a more
lenient rule "which would allow affirmance of a conviction if the
evidence other than the involuntary confession was sufficient to
102 Id. at 1263.
101 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., delivering the opinion of the court) (citing Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).
"I Id. (citing Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990) (unconstitutional jury in-
structions at sentencing stage of capital case); Delaware v. Van Arsdal, 475 U.S. 673 (1986)
(restriction of defendant's right to cross-examine witness, in violation of Sixth Amendment);
Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972) (confession obtained in violation of Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964))).
"I Id. at 1264.
,o6 Id. at 1264-65.
11 Id. at 1264.
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sustain the verdict."' 18 Thus, Payne is not controlling as stare
decisis. Finally, Rehnquist suggested that there is no sensible reason
for treating confessions obtained in violation of the Sixth Amend-
ment differently from confessions obtained in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In Rehnquist's view, neither evidentiary
concerns, nor deterrence of improper police conduct, nor some-
thing more "fundamental" about coerced confessions can justify
such disparate treatment. 1' 9
White's dissent, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens,
accused the majority of overruling a "vast body of precedent
without a word and in so doing dislodg[ing] one of the fundamental
tenets of our criminal justice system." 110 White cited many pre-
Chapman and a few post-Chapman decisions for the proposition
that admitting a coerced confession is a violation of due process
of law that requires reversal regardless of other evidence in support
of the verdict."' Referring to the Chapman footnote, White refused
to distinguish coerced confessions from the other two constitutional
errors. He quoted different language in Payne, where that Court
observed that, "no one can say what credit and weight the jury
gave to the confession."" 2 The dissent also attacked Rehnquist's
"trial error/structural defect distinction," and cited two cases in-
volving errors at the same point in trial proceedings, one requiring
automatic reversal and one being subject to harmless-error analy-
sis." 3
116 Id. at 1264. Rehnquist quoted the following passage from Payne:
"Respondent suggests that, apart from the confession, there was adequate
evidence before the jury to sustain the verdict. But where, as here, an invol-
untary confession constitutes a part of the evidence before the jury and a
general verdict is returned, no one can say what credit and weight the jury
gave to the confession. And in these circumstances this Court has uniformly
held that even though there may have been sufficient evidence, apart from the
coerced confession, to support a judgment of conviction, the admission in
evidence, over objection, of the coerced confession vitiates the judgment
because it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. (quoting Payne, 356 U.S. at 567-68).
' Id.
11 Id. at 1254 (White, J., dissenting).
"I Id. at 1253-54 (citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986); Jackson v. Denno, 378
U.S. 368 (1964); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361
U.S. 199, (1960)).
,2 Id. (citing 356 U.S. at 568).
Id. at 1254-55 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (failure to instruct
a jury on the reasonable doubt standard resulted in reversal without an analysis of the
harm) and Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979) (analyzing the failure to instruct the
jury on the presumption of innocence under harmless-error)).
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White focused instead on the effect the error has on the trial
and the nature of the right protected. He argued that the eviden-
tiary impact of a coerced confession is too great to fall under
harmless-error analysis. Although he found a distinction between
confessions obtained in violation of the Fourteenth and Sixth
Amendments, his primary concern was that "ours is an accusatorial
and not an inquisitorial system,""14 and that "the police must obey
the law while enforcing the law."115 He concluded that using a
coerced confession against a defendant at trial is fundamentally
unfair. Finally, White reiterated his view that stare decisis requires
automatic reversal." 6
C. Application of the Harmless-Error Standard
Having concluded that Fulminante's confession was involuntary
but subject to harmless-error analysis, the Court split for a third
time on the issue of whether the error was harmless under the facts
of Fulminante. Applying the Chapman standard, White, joined by
Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and Kennedy, placed some emphasis
on both the danger of the confession's unreliability, and the confes-
sion's impact on the jury. He rejected the Arizona Supreme Court's
view that Fulminante's confession to Sarivola was cumulative to
the other confession, and that the overwhelming evidence remaining
would have been enough to convict. Instead, he focused on the
importance of the erroneously admitted confession itself. White
expressed concern that the prosecution had depended on both
confessions, that without the first confession the second would
have seemed unbelievable, and that admission of the first confes-
sion led to the admission of other prejudicial evidence. He also
noted that the first confession may have influenced Fulminante's
sentencing. "17
Rehnquist dissented, joined by O'Connor and Scalia. The brief
dissent endorsed the Arizona Supreme Court's view, viewing the
case as a "classic case of harmless error" because of the presence
of the second confession." 8
4 Id. at 1256 (quoting Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961)).
"I Id. (quoting Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959)).
116 Id. at 1257.
I7 d. at 1258-61 (White, J., delivering the opinion of the court).
. Id. at 1266 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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IV. SIGNiICANcE OF TmH DECISION
The two opinions on the voluntariness question highlight the
amorphous quality of the "totality of the circumstances" test.
White and Rehnquist simply drew different conclusions from the
same record. With no allegation of physical violence on behalf of
the police, the question amounted to analyzing Fulminante's sub-
jective reaction to the events. Under the circumstances, the major-
ity's holding gives a broad meaning to "involuntary." Sarivola
was not a police officer, but an inmate and informant. Eliciting
the information from Fulminante was somewhat fortuitous, and it
is not at all clear that Fulminante ever felt threatened. While
coercive factors were present, the situation was readily distinguish-
able from Payne."'9 White's invocation of that case almost trivial-
izes the Payne defendants' predicament. Fulminante suggests that
at least four sitting justices (the majority minus Marshall) are
willing to find coercion in much less egregious circumstances than
prior cases had indicated.
The debate between Rehnquist and White over whether the
admission of a coerced confession could ever be harmless error
reflects the ambiguity created by Chapman.120 First, they disagree
over the significance of the footnote reference to a coerced con-
fession case,12' White reading this most broadly as precedent to be
followed'- and Rehnquist dismissing it as a historical reference. 23
Neither view is unreasonable, and commentators have supported
both. 24 Perhaps unwilling to weaken his position by adopting
Rehnquist's approach to the analysis, White does not refer to
Chapman's later citation of Payne.-5 The second reference is a
stronger indication that the Chapman Court meant coerced con-
fessions would continue to require automatic reversal, but emphasis
on that reference would not support the idea that Justice Black
wanted to retain automatic reversal for the other types of cases
discussed in the footnote. Rehnquist's reading of Payne, regarding
that Court's rejection of harmless-error analysis, is labored. Rehn-
quist is much more willing to dissect both Chapman and Payne to
119 Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560. See supra note 99.
11 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
121 Fulminante, III S. Ct. at 1254-64 (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 n.8).
'2 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
'2 111 S. Ct. at 1264.
124 See supra notes 71-92 and accompanying text.
12, Chapman, 386 U.S. at 26.
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make his point. The ambiguity of those decisions, however, is weak
ground on which to declare a constitutional principle and depart
from precedent.
Moving beyond the language of Chapman, the Rehnquist/
White debate over which constitutional errors require reversal and
why grows out of their different approaches to harmless-error
analysis. Rehnquist's trial error/structural defects distinction is
similar to one commentator's analysis. 126 Implicit in that author's
reasoning, though, is the notion that coerced confessions do require
automatic reversal and that the overwhelming evidence rationale
fails to justify this result. The fact that Rehnquist draws a similar
distinction suggests that he supports the overwhelming evidence
approach to harmless error.
Indeed, Rehnquist simply adopts the Arizona Supreme Court's
original view, which used the overwhelming evidence test and a
broad version of the cumulative evidence approach. His terse opin-
ion on this issue does not adequately respond to White's marshal-
ling of precedents and treats rather lightly a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. His dissatisfaction with the Court's judge-
ment on the voluntariness question may have led him to treat this
issue too casually. In short, Rehnquist "won" on the theoretical
harmless constitutional error point but "lost" on the specific results
of this case.
White's response to Rehnquist's trial error/structural defects
distinction is convincing and illustrates that no clear lines can be
drawn from prior cases on the harmless error/automatic reversal
question. He brings out various recognized rationales for requiring
reversal in coerced confession cases. 127 White sees coerced confes-
sions as inherently prejudicial, inherently unreliable, and represen-
tative of police misconduct.'2 White's description of the use of
such confessions as "fundamentally unfair" reflects his concern
with prosecutorial misconduct and public confidence in the criminal
justice system but also restates the Fourteenth Amendment basis
126 See Field, supra note 90. Field characterizes the admission of a coerced confession
as an error that "by [its] nature [is] especially damaging to a defendant," as opposed to
the other two types of error, which "infect the entire trial process." Id. at 29. She argues
that the Chapman footnote cases clearly put the focus on the constitutional error, making
the overwhelming evidence test inappropriate. Field points out that it would be inconsistent
to require automatic reversal in coerced confession cases under the overwhelming evidence
test, since if conviction were inevitable because of the remaining evidence, even a coerced
confession could be harmless. Id. at 30.
'" See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
In See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
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for not admitting coerced confessions. Invoking all these rationales,
White's analysis does not clarify the reason for requiring automatic
reversal due to coerced confessions but not as a result of other
constitutional errors. It does suggest, however, that he has a dif-
ferent approach to harmless-error analysis.
White's focus on the effect of the error at trial and the nature
of the right protected clearly falls within the first category of errors
identified by commentators.' 29 Indeed, his harmless-error analysis
opinion explicitly rejects the overwhelming evidence and cumulative
routes. White's willingness to speculate on the possible effects,
both subtle and dramatic, of admitting Fulminante's first confes-
sion illustrates how difficult the harmless-error standard of Chap-
man is to meet. Despite the other evidence and the close vote on
voluntariness, White sent the case back to be retried without the
first confession.
The opinions on either side of the most controversial aspect of
Fulminante-that coerced confessions may in some cases be harm-
less-reflect academic speculation after Chapman. The White/
Rehnquist debate was academic,'as well. The application of harm-
less-error analysis to the coerced confession yielded the same result
as automatic reversal. In the end, the Arizona Supreme Court's
decision was affirmed. Despite the hue and cry over Rehnquist's
one majority holding, it is difficult to see the "harm" coming
from Fulminante. The fact that four members of the Court were
willing to find a confession coerced on the Fulminante facts, and
a slightly different four could find its admission harmful error,
suggests that involuntary confessions will almost always be found
harmful.
A fairly elaborate set of assumptions is required to conclude
that Fulminante could encourage police misconduct. First,
Miranda3 ° greatly reduced the significance of Fourteenth Amend-
ment challenges to confessions. Furthermore, as one commentator
observed about Chapman, "[o]nly on the presumption that some
police will violate constitutional standards, in the hope that the
trial judge will erroneously admit the evidence obtained and that
the appellate court will erroneously find the error harmless, will a
harmless error rule encourage" such misconduct.' 31 Automatic re-
versal seems unnecessary, as the protection of a harmless-error rule
is enough of a safeguard. However, one can hardly expect any
'9 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
330 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
,' Mause, supra note 55, at 552.
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gain in judicial efficiency to result from the adoption of the harm-
less-error approach. As in Fulminante, both the questions of vol-
untariness and harm will be litigated at all levels. Again as in
Fulminante, the final result may be the same: retrial without the
confession.
Discussing the implications of Fulminante by examining the
votes on the various issues illustrates a more disturbing aspect of
the decision. Structured as it is, and framing the questions as it
did, it is simply hard to tell what the "message" of the decision
is. 1" 2 No holding commanded more than five votes. Rehnquist and
O'Connor on the one hand and White, Marshall, Blackmun and
Stevens on the other voted as blocs. Scalia diverged, although his
opinions would have reached the same result as those of Rehnquist
and O'Connor. Souter's vote is missing on the third question.
But perhaps the most unusual stance is that of Kennedy. He
voted that the confession was not coerced, that a coerced confes-
sion could be harmless error, but found its admission harmful.
Kennedy concurred in the judgment to affirm, writing: "In the
interests of providing a clear mandate to the Arizona Supreme
Court in this capital case, I deem it proper to accept in the case
now before us the holding of five Justices that the confession was
coerced and inadmissible."' 33
A recent article discusses the issues raised by Kennedy's votes. 13 4
Kennedy voted against his own position. It may be a "clear man-
date" to Arizona, but it would have been equally clear if Kennedy
had voted to uphold the conviction. The problem with Kennedy's
stance is that it undermines the legitimacy of the Court. The actual
result of the case did not have the support of the majority, and
leaves a remarkably opaque message for lower courts and Court
observers.
"I Indeed, one commentator, writing shortly after the opinion, asserted that Fulmi-
nante did not hold that harmless-error analysis applies to coerced confessions. See Lewis J.
Liman, Fulminante: Vote Cycling and the Court, N.Y. L. J., Apr. 3, 1991, Essay section,
at 2 (reasoning that "harmless-error analysis was essential to the vote of only one of the
justices in the majority and therefore cannot be considered a holding").
"I111 S. Ct. at 1267.
"' John M. Rogers, "I Vote This Way Because I'm Wrong'" The Supreme Court
Justice as Epimenides, 79 Ky. L.J. 439 (1990-91). Rogers explains that to overturn the
conviction, a majority had to decide both (X) that the confession was coerced, and (Y) that
its admission was not harmless error. Voting logically, Kennedy would have voted to uphold
the conviction, since he agreed with Y but not X. Instead, he voted against his own view
that the confession was not coerced. Id. at 475 n.124. A similar stance was taken by Justice
White in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). Rogers, supra, at 439 n.l.
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CONCLUSION
In the end, the voting pattern in Fulminante may be its most
disturbing aspect. Once the doctrines they are fighting about are
understood, the pointed debate between White and Rehnquist be-
comes little more than an academic exercise. The inherently fact-
specific and subjective nature of the voluntariness inquiry, together
with the varying and largely unexpressed rationales behind the
Court's harmless-error analysis, belie any clear results in analogous
cases. Given the votes on what constitutes a coerced confession
and how its harm is assessed, the decision is unlikely to have any
serious impact on the rights of criminal defendants. Those looking
for an example of Rehnquist Court extremism or a dramatic retreat
from the Warren Court days will probably be disappointed in
Fulminante. Unfortunately, anyone looking for a clear statement
of the law will be equally disappointed. In a country where the
Supreme Court declares the law of the land, that is indeed
disturbing.
Kenneth R. Kenkel
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